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BETWEEN THE SCYLLA OF LEGAL FORMALISM AND THE CHARYBDIS
CONCEPTUALISM: YALE’S POLICY SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF

POLICY

Hengameh Saberi*

I. Introduction
In 1943, an enduring collaboration between a political scientist and a legal scholar
began to develop as the New Haven Jurisprudence.1 Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal
considered the past and contemporaneous record of international law jurisprudence to be
inadequate to meet the needs of the post-WWII world. In their view, international law was
historically riddled with inertia of philosophical properties such as speculative, transcendental,
"the ancient philosophical exercise of logical derivation," metaphysical absolutes, theological,
and a "quest for the ultimate and absolute meaning of law and justice."2 To remedy that, they
centered the application of their comprehensive jurisprudence on international law and
introduced the New Haven School’s (NHS’s) policy-oriented approach.
The policy-oriented international law aimed to replace the legalism of traditional
thinking with pragmatism of interdisciplinary and social scientific insights. Its pragmatism was
well captured in two central ideas: contextualism and problem-solving orientation. In a synoptic
description, Yale’s configurative jurisprudence views law as a process of authoritative and
controlling decisions that are located in various phases of contextual analysis. In any process of
legal decision-making, there are parties with claims about values who pose demands on the
authoritative decision-makers to weigh their claims and counterclaims and make prescriptions.3
Legal decision-making requires a three-tier analysis of “values”, “phase” and “conditions.”
These categories provide a reasonably full access to the values contested, knowledge about
participants with a claim over values, and the past, present, and future of value distribution in the
world power process.4
Conditions refer to the particular location of a context within the larger context of world
power process.5 In the phase analysis, there are specific factors that help dissect the features of
1

Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943) (introducing for the first time the New Haven School’s collaborative
scholarship).
2
1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLICY 71, 178 (1992).
3
Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, in
MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157, 168 (1964) [hereinafter STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER].
4
For one such application to the question of coercion, for instance, see MYRES M. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO
FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 16–20
(1994).
5
See MYRES M. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE 34 (1967) (identifying some of the factors
that affect the authoritative process of interpretation and application of international agreements as follows: changes
in the relative strength of contending visions of world public order which commend persuasion or coercion as
instruments of social change, changes in the composition of territorial communities affecting the modalities of
communication and common perception of meaning, changes in the technology of communication, and changes in
[continues on the next page]
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each individual context: participants (who acted in varying roles that culminated in a particular
outcome?), perspectives (what were the expectations and value demands of participants and who
did they identify with?), situations (where and under what conditions were the participants
interacting?), base value (what effective means were at the disposal of participants to achieve
their objectives?), strategies (in what manner were this means manipulated?), outcome (what was
the immediate result of this interaction for value allocation?), and finally, effect (what are the
effects of different duration of the outcome of the interaction?)6
Contrary to traditional, rule-oriented adjudication or interpretation, in a policy-oriented
system, the decision-maker or legal scholar takes aid from all these contextual elements to treat
each case as a unique context. Yet the guiding star of decision-making and what makes a policyoriented international law relevant for the future of a democratic world order is the promotion of
the universal values of human dignity.7 These values remain raw postulates rather than ripe
fruits of reasoning. To avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of normative justification that, under the
NHS’s account, have historically plagued jurisprudence and fueled endless disputes, the policyoriented scholars of human dignity neither seek nor offer any normative justification for their
preferred value commitments.8 Considering the Cold War understanding of the values of human
dignity that belonged to the free world vis-à-vis totalitarianism, it is not particularly surprising
that the application and interpretation of these values happened to correspond with the practice
and desires of the leader of the free world, the U.S.
Despite its masterly design and broad scope, the NHS’s policy science received a fair
share of criticism at its own time and persuaded only a handful of disciples in international law.
On the one hand, scholars were skeptical about the plausibility of scientific objectivity and the
impartial application of the NHS’s methodology to international legal questions.9 Under this
view, New Haven’s pseudo-scientism was nothing more than a complex language with a simple
objective: the maintenance and legitimization of the U.S. national interest. On the other hand,
some scholars reacted to McDougal’s broad understanding of social processes that defined law.
These critiques were plainly against the intrusion of power politics and policy into law either in a
positivist fashion10 or in line with the concerns of international relations scholars who opposed
strategies of cooperation in shaping and sharing values that may affect expectations about future modalities of such
cooperation).
6
See Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & Michael W. Reisman, Theories about International Law: Prologue
to A Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 188, 198 (1968).
7
These values, which are in fact categories of desired events or preferences, are power (participation in making
important decisions – those involving severe deprivations), respect (access to other values on the basis of merit
without discrimination on the grounds irrelevant to capacity), enlightenment (access to the knowledge which is the
basis of rational choice), wealth (control over economic goods and services), well-being (enjoyment of physical and
psychic health), skill (proficiency in the exercise of latent talent), affection (enjoyment of sympathetic human
relationships), and rectitude (sharing a sense of community responsibility). See Myres S. McDougal, International
Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 133, 168 (1953) [hereinafter
International Law, Power, and Policy].
8
Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, in MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note …, at 987, 993.
9
See generally Leo Gross, Hans Kelsen, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 491, 499 (1973); Oran Young, International Law and
Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 74 (1972) (“McDougal has leaned
towards a somewhat uncritical acceptance of the views of the American 'establishment' on a number of specific
issues in the field of international relations.”).
10
See, e.g., JOSEPH KUNZ, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS 169 (1968); Anthony D’Amato, Book Review, 75
HARV. L. REV. 458, 460 (1961) (reviewing MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1964)).
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the implications of realism.11 Yet a third group simply objected to the convoluted style and
complex presentation in the New Haven Jurisprudence, which rendered it either
incomprehensible or impractical.12 Each strand of skepticism consists of nuanced and specific
objections to various theoretical and application features of the Lasswell-McDougal project, but
policy as legitimization, policy as invasion of power into law, and policy framework as
conceptual “grandiloquence”13 in fact comprise the body of resistance against the
methodological renewal of the New Haven Jurisprudence.
As interpreted by the received wisdom and perpetuated by McDougal himself, this
resistance has been attributed to international lawyers’ resolute aversion to policy thinking and
their strict loyalty to traditional rule-oriented approaches.14 Under this tale, the cold reception of
the NHS by the mainstream discipline reflects a conflict between law and policy – a rivalry
between the comfort of law's determinacy and autonomy versus the flexibility and uncertainty of
policy, in which the policy-oriented heresy lost ground as it faced a hardheaded discipline mostly
concerned with formalist legal reasoning and wary of extralegal social phenomena tainting the
image of the rule of law.
This essay poses a challenge to the conventional narrative about the career of the NHS
by arguing that the mainstream discipline's rejection of the policy-oriented methodology was not
a rejection of policy thinking as such, but rather an opposition to the conceptualism and
formulaic determinism of the New Haven Jurisprudence resulting from a peculiar combination of
a contextualist methodology and a non-cognitive view of normative values of human dignity.
Rather than between law and policy, the tension was between two different perceptions of
flexibility and rigidity. This tension, as suggested here, resulted from the NHS’s dogmatic and
erroneous presentation of what they dubbed traditional and rule-oriented approaches as formalist
and the mainstream discipline’s more accurate understanding of the policy-oriented international
law as a new form of formalism. I introduce this new form of formalism as ‘policy
conceptualism’ to suggest that the story of the NHS’s career was not a rivalry between law and
policy per se, but one between two understandings of an interpretive stance towards 'experience'
and 'logic' of a (pseudo)scientific method; between the determinative capacity of interpretative
tools and predictability of outcomes, expected to be facilitated by law, or guaranteed by
Stanley Hoffmann, Louis Henkin & Richard Falk, Mild Reformist and Mild Revolutionary, 24 J. INT’L AFF. 118,
118-20 (1970) (accusing the NHS of doing its best to undermine all the elements of law’s distinctiveness).
12
See, e.g., Herbert Briggs, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order—Principles of Content and
Procedure, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 543, 543 (1968) (book review) (calling the Lasswell-McDougal language
“dogmatic scientism”); Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators: Your Treaty or Our
“Interpretation” of It?, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 358, 360 (1971) (“[T]his book . . . is written in a highly esoteric private
language—we do not say jargon, but a land of juridical code which renders large tracks of it virtually
incomprehensible to the uninitiated (or at least to the unpracticed and unversed), short of a word by word ‘construe,’
such as we did in school with our Latin unseens.”).
13
The word is borrowed from Erwin Griswold who, recognizing the importance of Lasswell's and McDougal's
approach to legal education, nevertheless found it to be “impaired by a certain tendency towards grandiloquence.”
Erwin Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARV. L. REV. 292, 297 (1968).
14
McDougal noted:
11

We got much more attention than we wanted before we wanted it … We thought we'd have several years to formulate
the stuff and write it up before we got too much attention, but we got too much success too quickly to serve intellectual
purposes, and then we got the reaction.

1960 Curriculum Committee Report, Introduction, III, 1–6, cited in LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
1927–1960, at 185 (2001).
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democratic policies of human dignity; or between two conceptions of formalism: 'legal
formalism,' on the one hand, and 'policy conceptualism,' on the other.
To be sure, neither side would have admitted in the least to the slightest traces of
'formalism' in their prescribed way of arriving at legal outcomes. And, to be fair, the putative,
old legal formalism against which policy science rose did not most accurately describe the spirit
of the mainstream international law discipline of the day either. Yet the two opposing
perceptions of formalism, one attributed to the law and one resulting from the policy
conceptualism of the NHS, were so strong as to erect an insurmountable wall of conflict between
the advocates of policy sciences and their interlocutors.
Understanding the fate of the NHS’s policy-oriented approach to international law
through this counter-narrative is of both historical and jurisprudential significance. First, the
attribution of the cold reception of policy science to international lawyers’ orthodox concern
about guarding their disciplinary borders is inaccurate. The disciplinary aversion to scientific
demands, the NHS’s convoluted style of expression of those demands, and the historical and
institutional circumstances impacting the fate of the policy-oriented approach are all indubitable.
But they all reinforce a conventional understanding about the clash of the orthodox with a work
of renewal in which the content of the renewal project was outright rejected. Such a reading
disregards the characteristics internal to the structure and application of the New Haven
Jurisprudence that ultimately defeated its main promises of flexibility and context-sensitivity.
What the discipline reacted against was the fact that the propagated contextual methodology of
the policy-oriented approach pivoting around the central, but acontextual normative values of
human dignity gave rise to highly predictable outcomes that were invariably over-determined by
the policy implications of those normative values. Rather than between determinacy and
indeterminacy, or predictability and unpredictability of outcomes, then, the conflict was between
two different kinds of determinacy: one that was sought, with hope if not certainty, in the
universality of legal rules, and the other that was indeed invariably guaranteed by the policy
implications of values of human dignity. It was in reaction to this latter kind of determinacy that
the international law profession became ever more persistent in safeguarding what it believed to
be the jurisdiction of the law.
Second, this counter-narrative also refutes two simplistic but enduring associations: an
inherent association of formalism with law and that of anti-formalism with policy. Following the
legacy of the received wisdom about the NHS’s career, considerations of policy in international
legal decision-making are often taken to evince anti-formalism in opposition to the formalism of
legal rules. This distorted depiction simply reduces the opposition between formalism and antiformalism to one between law and policy, and thereby, both overlooks the risks of rigidity or
formalism equally borne by policy reasoning and closes the door long before it is opened to a
better understanding of the place of policy in legal argumentation.
Rather than define the concept as such, the next two sections will locate policy
conceptualism in the epistemic structure of New Haven’s policy science (II) inherited from
Lasswell’s behavioralism (III). Section IV will then recount some of the debates between the
NHS and its contemporaneous international lawyers to demonstrate that the discipline’s rejection
of policy science was a rejection of policy conceptualism and its resulting dogmatism rather than
hostility against policy reasoning as such.

II. Conceptualism and Epistemic Structure of the New Haven Jurisprudence
The principal alternative of the policy-oriented approach to the legal formalism against
which it set itself up is contextualism. Context-sensitivity through a comprehensive examination
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of elements of “values,” “phase,” and “conditions” in the New Haven Jurisprudence embodies
the pragmatist promises of policy-consciousness with a normative direction.15 Yet I have
elsewhere argued that due to the epistemic structure of New Haven's contextualism and problemsolving methodology, these two fundamental promises of the Yale approach in fact remained
ineffectual.16 The unreflective adoption of eight postulates as indices of universal human dignity
in principle and subjecting the entire enterprise of contextual inquiry to the superiority of those
postulates fatally blunts the true promises of pragmatism. The New Haven Jurisprudence
operates on epistemic incongruence between a general contextualist ambition which commands a
rigorous examination of all the non-evaluative contextual elements on the one hand, and a
peculiar exemption of the normative values of human dignity from all inquiry and doubt on the
other. The result is two-fold: defining those normative commitments in accordance with some
parochial standards and misrepresenting them as universal values; and adopting and applying
those normative commitments to overrule all other contextually-verified factors in any number of
legal questions in such a manner that legal outcomes are simply over-determined with the highest
degree of predictability.
In addition to the inherent problems plaguing the contextualist methodology of the NHS
that result from its non-cognitive view of the determinative values of human dignity, its very
contextualist framework of analysis of the various aspects of social processes of interaction
between agents has been presented in multi-layered sets of conceptual categories.
The over-determining role of the postulates of human dignity only becomes evident at
the time of the application of the policy-oriented jurisprudence to particular cases. So when
skeptics point to the partiality of the policy-oriented jurisprudence for U.S. foreign policy
interests, they look at the rigid determination of legal outcomes in light of human dignity
superseding all other contextual elements. They do not, therefore, go beyond the peculiar issues
of application to consider the fundamental consequences of an epistemic discriminatory view of
the normative and the non-normative. In other words, they focus exclusively on the
consequences of the application of the policy-oriented approach and neglect its epistemic
structural makeup, which is in fact the cause of the rigid application of the NHS’s contextualist
framework to legal questions in practice.
Contrary to the crucial but nuanced difference between regarding the overdetermining
role of the NHS’s normative commitments as a mere problem of application or inherent in its
epistemic structure, the formulaic presentation of contextual categories and conceptual tools
delineating what constitutes ‘context’ in the social processes of law is too bold to escape the first
glance of any casual reader of the New Haven Jurisprudence. These complex categories of
contextual elements, besides the NHS’s generally convoluted language, in fact explain why most
of the mainstream international lawyers’ engagement with McDougal was over the
implementation of the policy-oriented jurisprudence in the world public order writings. The
conceptual categories of contextual elements, on a theoretical height before touching the ground
of actual legal decision-making contest, seemed too abstract to be interpreted, critically assessed,
adopted or rejected on their face. One would expect that a jurisprudential heresy as intelligent
and ambitious as the NHS should have been met by copious critical consideration and theoretical
reflection of jurisprudes on the nature of its theoretical teachings. But with very few exceptions,
the lion’s share of debate between McDougal or his associates and their critics circled around the
15

See supra notes 3 and 4.
See H. Saberi, Love it or Hate It, but for the Right Reasons: Pragmatism and the New Haven School's
International Law of Human Dignity, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (2012).
16
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doctrinal bearings of a policy-oriented approach for questions of world public order and were
recorded mostly in the genre of book reviews.17 This fact in itself attests to the complexity and
abstractness of New Haven’s conceptual framework of contextualism, articulated in formula and
categories that did not touch a chord in the minds of the mainstream lawyers who, like
mainstream political scientists of their time, did not appreciate the method-driven conceptualism
of behavioralism in which such categories had their roots.
So what is introduced here as policy conceptualism is in fact a combination of two
essential features of the New Haven Jurisprudence: first, the over-determining role of human
dignity leading to rigid and defining implications of those values for legal outcomes (manifested
in application); and second the conceptual categorization of contextual elements – elements that
are all to eventually be subordinated to human dignity (constituting the complex structure of the
contextualist approach of the policy-oriented jurisprudence). It was this policy conceptualism
that defined the essence of the mainstream discipline’s skeptical reaction against the policyoriented approach. By re-listening to the echoes of the doctrinal dialogue between McDougal
and his critics over some of the questions in fashion for international lawyers of the time, one can
appreciate that the flame of skepticism was not fanned by a principled opposition to the
employment of policy in legal thinking per se, but by the particular method of the application of
policy that in structure, application and outcome was as rigid, if not more, than a positivisminspired legal analysis or abuse of deduction.
To appreciate the roots of policy conceptualism, however, it is helpful to first revisit
Lasswell's configurative policy science which in essence defined the NHS’s configurative
approach. Lasswell's strong commitment to the method-driven, scientific approach of
behavioralism, on the one hand, and what eventually came to be a non-reflective commitment to
a set of norms signifying human dignity, on the other, betrays an oscillation between
transcendentalism and pragmatism – between the eternal and the temporal, the absolute and the
contingent, and the universal and the particular. His normative commitments already estranged
him from behavioralists and triggered their criticism, but it did not substantively distinguish his
policy conceptualism from behavioralism's enthusiasm for categories of conceptions, analytical
tools, levels of analysis, and precision of applied methods of scientific analysis.

III. Conceptualism and Behavioralism
Political scientists view behavioralism as a landmark movement of the 1950s and 1960s
which divided the history of their field. Divided about the scope of its impact, many of its
proponents, at least in retrospect, thought it fell short of its potentials of a revolutionary
disciplinary change,18 while its hostile critics accused it of a hegemonic scientific takeover.19 As
17

For a prominent exception, see William Morison, in Myers S. McDougal and Twentieth-Century Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Essay, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYERS S. MCDOUGAL
1 (W.M. Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976).
18
See, e.g., 1978 APSA Presidential Address of John C. Wahlke, Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science, 73 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 9 (1979), cited in ROBERT ADCOCK, INTERPRETING BEHAVIORALISM IN MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE:
ANGLO-AMERICAN EXCHANGES SINCE 1880, at 180–181 (Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir & Shannon C. Stimson eds.,
2007).
19

See, e.g., Sheldon S. Wolin, Political Theory as a Vocation, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1062 (1969), cited in ADCOCK, supra note ... Some revisionists also call for moderation when
assessing the reach and depth of behavioralism's impact. See Robert Adcock & Mark Bevir, The
Remaking of Political Theory, in MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note …, at 209–10
(challenging specifically the idea that behavioralism eliminated or took over political theory).
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it is the case with any transformative movement, sifting through the specious and the genuine in
the stock of all that has been attributed to behavioralism still fuels academic debates. Standing at
the opposite spectrum end of disciplinary reform proposals from some of the German émigrés,
such as Leo Strauss and Hans Morgenthau, who were equally dissatisfied with the state of the
study of politics, behavioralism proposed a systematic change that has received a fair share of
censure for propagating ahistorical research.20 For all the critiques of ahistoricism, however,
revisionists furnish defense by questioning what 'historical' research in fact means – if being
historical for a discipline means conducting original research on the past, they contend, then
American politics was no more historical before behavioralism than it was afterwards.21
Whatever differences about the level of impact and (a)historical trait of behavioralism,
there is little to dispute about advancement of techniques and importance of research skills
promoted by the movement. Reliance on techniques, however, though often associated with
quantitative work, should not discount the special place of theory in behavioralism. For
behavioralism, in fact, propagated a conception of theory that linked self-conscious abstraction in
the interest of producing analytical frameworks with systematic empirical research.22 In a neopositivist search for universalism, behavioralism started with macro-level assumptions about
political systems or societies and worked with a high level of conceptual abstract theories that
could systematically be applied to the empirical results it attained through sophisticated
quantitative techniques.
Aspiring to liberate theory from particular historical contexts and find a scientific
universal language, some of the masterminds of behavioralism such as Harold Lasswell23 and
David Easton24 laid the foundation for what the movement adopted as the standards for
evaluating a theoretical framework: universality, deductive structure, and instrumental utility for
empirical research.25 This instrumental utility was different from the instrumentalism
championed by early twentieth-century American social and political thinkers sympathetic to
pragmatism. Utility in short, for behavioralists, could mean anything but advancement of a
substantive normative ideal. This is where Lasswell, quite dramatically, broke apart from the
movement he had a fair share nourishing with his widely-acknowledged prodigious intellectual
energy.
Lasswell, it must be noted, took pains to qualify the limits of universality of theory. Put
more accurately, the genius of Lasswell did not neglect the potential risk of reverting to logical
abstraction through a behavioralist-advocated universalism of theory. Lasswell is thought to
have taken to A.N. Whitehead, despite no explicit evidence, and accepted the philosophical idea
of "emergence" in his reference to "emergent" and "manifold of events."26 There is more
supporting evidence, in Lasswell's 'developmental' thinking and general framework of contextual
analysis, for the presence of a multi-layered conception of 'emergence' in his thinking.27
20

See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITICS (1946); B. Crick, The Science of Politics in the
United States, 20 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 308 (1954).
21
ADCOCK, supra note …, at 192.
22
Id. at 207–08.
23
See HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950).
24
See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (1953).
25
Adcock & Bevir, supra note … , at 215.
26
Heinz Eulau, The Maddening Methods of Harold D. Lasswell: Some Philosophical Underpinnings, in POLITICS,
PERSONALITY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HAROLD D. LASSWELL 15,
21 (Arnold Rogo ed., 1969).
27
Id., at 22.
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"Emergent evolution" – with its conceptions of existential and functional emergence – maintains
that no single theory or explanation could equally apply to the phenomena coming to existence at
different points or standing at different levels of organization. The result is pluralism of
propositions and nondeducibility – both unpredictability and irreducibility – of phenomena.28
To reconcile 'emergence', which requires an inductive analysis of details, with a theory
of the whole, Lasswell states: "Sound Political analysis is nothing less than correct orientation in
the continuum which embraces the past, present, and future. Unless the salient feature of the allinclusive whole are discerned, details will be incorrectly located . . ."29 Then, in case this does
not just yet sufficiently stress theory and perception of the whole, a few pages later Lasswell
writes: "The gradual creation of a sense of wholeness, and of assurance in the discovery of
interdetail connections within the all-encompassing totality, also requires new methods of formal
exposition."30
Despite a lifetime search for "new methods of formal exposition," for Lasswell, the
choice of the level of analysis and one between an intensive or extensive configurative approach,
at least so far as the modern analysis of human relationship is concerned, is a matter of
expediency and not principle. It is the level of analysis that in fact determines the appropriate
mode of analysis. What might be accurately generalizable on one level of analysis could well be
limited in another. It is the responsibility of the behavioralist scientist to be alert about her
'observational standpoint' and level of analysis at every step to determine the scope of the total
context and the generalizability limits in that context.
Perhaps the most developed articulation of the levels of analysis in Lasswell's work
comes later and is introduced as the well-known idea of intellectual tasks well-traveled between
different disciplines:
Any problem-solving approach to human affairs poses five intellectual tasks, . . . ---goal,
trend, conditions, projection, and alternative. The first question, relating to goal, raises
the traditional problem of clarifying the legitimate aims of a body politic. After goals are
provisionally clarified, the historical question arises. In the broadest context, the principal
issue is whether the trend of events in America or throughout the world community has
been toward or away from the realization of preferred events. The next question goes
beyond the simple inventories of change and asks which factors condition one another
and determine history. When trend and factor knowledge is at hand, it is possible to
project the course of future developments on the preliminary assumption that we do not
ourselves influence the future. Finally, what policy alternatives promise to bring all
31
preferred goals to optimal fulfillment?

This bold and sophisticated outline of intellectual tasks of a policy scientist appears to
leave no doubt about a masterfully crafted design of a problem-solving oriented approach to
social science. Yet upon further probing, some legitimate questions overshadow the appearance
of the facially unmistakable contextualism assumed in the structure of this approach. It bears
emphasis that some of these questions are questions of application, but some others are not.
They rather relate to the very design of the intellectual tasks with which policy scientists of
democracy are entrusted. First, goal clarification in policy science remains an intuitive, rather
than natural or scientific, task. That the clarified norms reflect the native properties of their
28

Id. at 23.
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 4 (1935).
30
Id. at 12.
31
HAROLD LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 1–2 (1963).
29

Draft version – H. Saberi

8

authors would be innocuous, if policy science did not give so much credence to objectivity. As it
stands now, however, maintaining ‘observational standpoint,’ is at worst a mirage, and at best a
noble dream.
Second, trend (historical) and conditions (scientific) thinking processes are either
nothing more than fact-gathering, or as is more likely given the method-driven nature of policy
science, they proceed on the basis of a formulated method of interpreting historical events and
scientific interpretation. If they are the former, the value of their fact-gathering effort depends
on the manner in which those facts will be used. If they are the latter, however, they are
circumscribed by the restrictions of the projected goals – if there has been progress towards or
decline away from the realization of those goals – and accompanying assumptions that not only
impact but in fact shape their results.
Third, developmental and alternative thinking are similarly influenced by conceptually
determining factors. Projecting the course of future events is true to its problem-solving promise
only when it adopts a comprehensive probabilistic approach. Imbued with the optimism of the
realization of initially projected goals, it is a jubilant self-fulfilled prophesy. Likewise, policy
alternatives are meaningful when the pigeon holes of original normative assumptions and the
results of prior historical and scientific tasks have not already so predictably conscribed the
ambit of permissible and impermissible policies.
Lasswell's contextualism and problem-solving oriented theory is a response to the
limitations of both empiricism and rationalism. Yet both in structure and in application, it relies
on a form of deductive reasoning of its own. This deductive scheme is not incidental to policy
science, but rather inherent in its larger intellectual progenitor of behavioralism and the role and
epistemic character of its normative commitments. In the first place, suspicious of the
insidiously masked analytical categories and hypotheses of the empiricist investigator, Lasswell's
policy scientist forthrightly adopts the transparent, analytical categories that (allegedly)
contextualize the frame of analysis. That different categories of intellectual tasks above, for
instance, imbricate, instantiate, and substantiate one another is not disputed by policy science –
there is an order of priority in which they are recommended to take place after all. But that the
investigator is advised to checkmark all these categories in any particular context regardless of
the subject matter suggests the importance of pursuing a strict method for analysis. This
categorical conceptualism is equally true in other elements of context (values, phase, and
conditions) so fundamental to the New Haven Jurisprudence. The legal scientist has to operate
the comprehensive contextual analysis using the recommended categories regardless of whether
and how the subject matter lends itself to such an examination.32
In the second place, in addition to the categorical conceptualism often presented as a
"verbal juggling act" inspired by behavioralism,33 the predominant normative values and goals of
policy science, both applied as one of the categories of contextual elements and as the defined
32

For an illustration in international law, see Saberi supra note 16 FN 284; see also Charles Chaumont, Book
Reviews: Law and Public Order in Space: By McDougal, Lasswell & Vlasic, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271
(1963) (suggesting that the policy-oriented "distinctions constantly made between trends, claims, activities, policies,
interactions, appraisals and recommendations, as much as those between participants, objectives, situations, base
values, strategies, outcomes and effects appear not only somewhat repetitious but also relatively artificial, or at the
very least not altogether sound"). For an admiring description of New Haven's categorical concepts of
contextual analysis and a clear statement of its method-oriented approach, see Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew
Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 44 German Y.B. INT’L L. 96, 112 (2001).
33
BARRINGTON MOORE, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY 89–110, 99 (1962).

Draft version – H. Saberi

9

subject of the first intellectual tasks, in the last analysis, give the contextual and problemoriented investigation a deductive effect. In a sensible contextualist frame, normative values find
a place among all other considerations subject to a balancing act of decision-making to determine
their practical implications. But in a system where human dignity, as defined by policy sciences,
overrules all the other contextual factors and has the a priori, last determinative word, it is
almost a redundancy to state that decisions are deduced from the categorical values of human
dignity.34
In a like manner, the guiding star function of the goals clarified through the first
intellectual task for the historical, scientific, developmental and alternative thinking merely
satisfies the analyst that she has exhausted all the categories of the recommended configurative
method to forestall the intrusion of unwarranted assumptions or untested hypotheses. But in fact,
the cumulative effect of all the prescribed intellectual tasks is reinforcement of the avowedly
clarified (e.g., postulated) values of human dignity. The net result of intellectual labor is simply
determined by the original postulates. If for empiricists, their disguised assumptions, as claimed
by behavioralism, foist meaning upon the facts, for policy sciences also, its clearly articulated
normative assumptions determine the results of investigation. One would surely prefer disclosed
assumptions over disguised hypotheses, but that does not substantially change the fact that
unjustified assumptions finally determine the results, or the fact that policy science misrepresents
a deduction from those assumptions for contextually-verified solutions.
With this brief background on policy conceptualism, it is now time to turn to the
reaction of international lawyers to the translation of the policy science methodology into
international law.

IV. In the Shadow of Hyperbole: Two Images of Formalism
That international law in particular took a strong position against policy conceptualism
and a deductive method in a post-realist age, when the myth of conceptualism and certainty of
legal outcomes had already been dispelled, should not be startling. Perhaps behavioralistinspired theories had less luck persuading lawyers compared to social scientists across various
disciplines because, in light of the practical nature of legal reasoning, the implications of
deduction from policy, similar in function to deduction from legal principles but different from
that only so far as the content of the conceptual principles was concerned, could more readily be
recognized and resisted in the process of legal decision-making.
More likely, however, U.S. international lawyers were impatient with policy
conceptualism because, having come from a tradition that had long opened its shores to policy
considerations in finding answers to actual problems of international relations, had a different
expectation about the function of policy from what was on offer by the NHS. To them, as it is
generally a matter of first impression about the application of policy in legal reasoning, policy
implied flexibility, avoiding binary oppositions and textual application of rules, and legal labor
that does not aim to furnish highly predictable results. The policy-oriented approach, on the
contrary, starts with postulates of human dignity, diametrically contrasted with human indignity,
Though “deduce” is a word that the New Haven masters avoid and only use to scoff at what they refer to as
formalism of the rule-oriented approach, Weston, an associate, uses the same word openly to describe the basic
modality of policy-oriented interpretation of agreements. “The overriding ‘goals’ of interpretation which the authors
[of the work under review] recommend and from which they deduce particular policies to fit exact issues are
designed, consistent with the New Haven Approach generally, ‘to give effect to the goals of a public order of human
dignity.’” Burns H. Weston, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order By Myres S. McDougal,
Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 650 (1969) (book review) (emphasis added).
34
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both of which have their respective Cold-War spirited representative, and establishes a
conceptually complex contextual framework that pivots around the postulated normative
commitments. In doing so, through a conceptually ingenious process of contextual analysis, it in
fact eventually deduces the outcomes that would best promote human dignity as defined by the
friends of its representatives. This is certainly different from the flexibility that international
lawyers have habitually associated with the application of policy in legal decision-making.
To be clear, the claim here is not that the mainstream discipline as a whole articulated a
defense against deduction from policy, or defined what that meant, or connected the
consequences of policy-oriented approach to its epistemic structure. The argument simply is that
the disciplinary distrust of the policy-oriented approach was not a distrust of policy per se, but a
consequence of justified skepticism about rigid outcomes dissonant with a deeply-rooted
consciousness about policy in international law. This long-rooted consciousness was not
systematic, but rather fluid, organic and natural. Correspondingly, the reactions to the world
public order writings did not follow a systematic critique of policy deduction, or a theoretical
elucidation to that effect, either. Nor was a discipline ingrained in an unsystematic and organic
policy thinking consciousness eventually persuaded by systematic, configurative theory of the
application of policy that in the last analysis robbed its subject – policy – of its natural and
familiar function and turned it into its opposite.
The illustration of the disciplinary reaction to rigidity and policy conceptualism
embedded and inherent in the policy-oriented jurisprudence is best found in the disagreements
between McDougal and associates and the discipline they aimed to reform over a number of
important practical questions of international law. Rather than attempting to cast a general
theoretical net over the general misgivings of international lawyers about the rigidity of the
policy-oriented approach – a theoretical explanation that was scarcely formulated as such by the
discipline itself, it is more helpful to listen to the echoes of some of those disagreements to bring
the point home. But before turning to that, one last note on the place and function of policy in
the NHS’s policy-oriented approach to legal decision-making is in order.
a. The Analytical Function of Policy in the New Haven Jurisprudence
Although anyone with some degree of allegiance to the NHS's legacy would cringe at
the thought of attempting to define law in McDougal's view, it would be helpful to momentarily
recall his outstanding critiques of the rule-oriented conception of law to make sense of where
policy comes into play. In McDougal's legal realist-inspired critical account, mainstream
international law firstly, has perpetuated the descriptive/prescriptive or de lege lata/de lege
ferenda dualism and thereby ignored, and consequently masked, the inevitable presence of policy
in legal decision-making dressed in the language of law.35 Secondly, the rule-oriented approach
takes technical rules to adequately contain the entire intellectual process of decisionmaking from
description of precedent, to prediction of outcomes, and prescription.36 Thirdly and relatedly, it
comfortably ignores the inherent ambiguity of legal language (and language in general) resulting
in gaps and complementarity of rules which simultaneously drives each individual case to
diametrically opposite directions.37
35

Myers S. McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES
COURS 133, 144 (1953).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 152, 156; see also MYERS S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 723–26 (1964). For
complementarity of rules, see MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
[continues on the next page]
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Stated most economically, McDougal's diagnosis of what he calls rule-oriented
jurisprudential thoughts of the past and his alternative policy-oriented approach take 'policy' to
fulfill two tasks: to furnish teleological reasoning (substance) and to facilitate the performance of
a balancing test (process). Policy provides content to fill in the gaps and interpret ambiguities in
a manner consistent with the higher-ranked desiderata on the hierarchy of social needs and
ideals. In its divisive function of balancing between various desiderata, policy is also a guarantor
of rationality and associated with enlightenment as it distinguishes between the subjective and
the objective, the past precedent and the future prediction, and the more immediately achievable
policy goals and the aspirations that may have to be replaced with alternative objectives.
Now looking at the structure and application of the New Haven Jurisprudence,
teleological inference is substantiated by a set of elements (conditions, phase and all its
subcategories of participants, perspectives, situations, base values, strategies, outcomes, effects,
and the other category of values) that constitute a contextual inquiry. In practice, however, the
value category overrules other contextual categories in implications and in its function as a
directive for determining outcomes. So the teleological value of the value category exceeds that
of other contextual considerations. All the other contextual variables are subject to further
inquiry, to empirical verification (be it historical – trend thinking - or scientific – scientific
thinking), and to a cost-benefit act of balancing. But policy implications of the value category,
irrespective of the other variable contextual conditions, remain unchanging and unchangeable in
any number of particular cases. So what the promotion of power, wealth, respect, enlightenment,
well-being, rectitude, affection, and skill would require and bind the decision-maker to ensure is,
in the last analysis, freestanding from the other context-specific circumstances and merely moves
between two poles of human dignity and human indignity.
As a balancing tool also, quite expectedly, the epistemically unjustified choice of the
normative values of human dignity restrains the function of policy analysis. To weigh the
varying measure of urgency or contribution of different policies in a context-sensitive
investigation, not only should the value and significance of each value category in that particular
context be assessed against all other contextual elements, but also the specific implications, fluid
meaning and dynamic consequences of each value category must be determined in conjunction
with, and in recognition of, all those other circumstantial factors. Power, wealth, enlightenment,
rectitude or other values might well imply one thing in one case and another in the next one,
depending on all the other interacting agents and elements present in the contextual game.
Besides, (and this might be more related to teleological capacity of policy than to
balancing per se), one has to wonder about other conceivable desiderata, such as security,
distribution of resources, and inclusion of the voices from the periphery for instance, that
depending on different circumstantial factors in a genuinely contextual analysis, could give a
different meaning to power, wealth, and enlightenment, not necessarily yielding to the direct
interest of McDougal's assigned representative of human dignity.38 To hold the value category
as a whole in an unrivaled position in no need of epistemic justification, and then to read the
PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 56–57 (1961); Myers S. McDougal, The
Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The Balanced Opposites of A Legal System, in THE ETHIC OF POWER 221,
221–26 (Harold Lasswell & Harlan Cleveland eds., 1962); Myers S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for A Free Society, 1
GA L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1966); Myers S. McDougal, Law As A Process of Decision: A Policy Oriented Approach to
Legal Study, 1 NAT. L. F. 53, 61–63 (1956).
38
McDougal is said to be concerned for human dignity in developing nations, like all nations, “but he does not see
the developing countries as requiring the separate and urgent attention of the legal process.” Rosalyn Higgins,
Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International Law, 23 INT’L ORG. 914, 924 (1969).
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implications of its subcategories categorically in line with the practice and interest of the
designated representatives of human dignity eviscerates the notion of balancing from all its
essential features but the name.
This rigidly determinative function of policy in legal decision-making resulting from
what this essay has introduced as the NHS's policy conceptualism in effect mirrors what Duncan
Kennedy refers to as "policy formalism" or "social conceptualism."39 Symptomatic of this kind
of formalism are "select[ing] policies arbitrarily, underestamat[ing] the conflicts among them,
and offer[ing] no defense of balancing as a rationally determinate procedure."40 The NHS
avowedly commits to a preference for a set of postulated values over others, consistently
interprets them in a manner leading to most predictable consequences without considering the
slightest possibility of disharmony in implications even among its randomly-selected values, and
as suggested above, leaves much to be desired in the way of a meaningful process of balancing.
b. International Law and Policy Conceptualism
To understand the reactions of the international law discipline against Yale’s policy
conceptualism, let us now look at some of the illustrative examples of significant debates
dividing the NHS and their opponents.
I.—Interpretation of International Agreements
The predictable closure epistemically inherent to the NHS, ironic for a jurisprudential
renewal that set itself the task of revolutionizing the history of rule-oriented approaches of the
past and their endemic formalism, is what triggered some of the critiques of McDougal's reliance
on 'shared expectations,' among other contextual factors, in legal interpretation.41 Shared
expectations could be taken to either refer to specific expectations in a particular agreement or to
general expectations "attached to the whole pattern of relationships between parties, including
procedures for the interpretation of agreements."42 In the former case, it would only be a
distorting concept as it dominates over all other relevant functions of the process of
interpretation, and in the latter, it is too general and vague to function as a useful guiding
principle at all. Yet McDougal finds 'shared expectations' to successfully help fill the gaps and
bring a kind of closure that in a rule-oriented approach, given the complementarity of rules,
would be either an illusion or contrived through an arbitrary assignment of a specific meaning to
a rule to justify the adjudicator's preferred outcome.43
39

Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 8634, 8635 (2001), citing Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
40
Id.
41
Gidon Gottlieb, The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law, 21 WORLD POL. 108, 126–27
(1968).
42
Id. at 126.
43
In the context of the law of war, McDougal describes the problem with complementarity of rules as follows:
[T]he rules of the law of war, like other legal rules, are commonly formulated in pairs of complementarity opposites
and are composed of a relatively few basic terms of highly variable reference. The complementarity in form and
comprehensiveness of reference of such rules are indispensable to the rational search for and application of policy to a
world of acts and events which presents itself to the decision-maker, not in terms of neat symmetrical dichotomies or
trichotomies, but in terms of enumerable gradations and alternations from one end of a continuum to the other; the
spectrum makes available to a decision-maker not one inevitable doom but multiple alternative choices.

MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 37, at 57.
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The outer limit of the subject of 'shared expectations' is, however, as undefined as
coming to an agreement on whose 'expectations' to include or exclude is debatable. A solution,
which is McDougal's use of policy, is to proceed on the basis of some postulated specific goals
of interpretation, and policing the outer borders of shared expectations with the aim of fostering
consensus over human dignity. But the "very postulation of fixed goals for interpretation is
bound … to have a distorting and misleading effect, for what is at stake in interpretation is not a
means-end form (type) of calculus to design means for reaching fairly stable ends."44 Postulating
goals and values as final arbitrators between relevant but competing alternatives does not resolve
the choice between those alternatives. It instead eliminates the choice altogether.
Against McDougal's over-emphasized accusation that lawyers neglect complementarity
and ambiguity of rules, critics responded with various degrees of sophistication. Some, in fact
did respond in the same way as the suspicious McDougal about the legalist discipline facing him
had anticipated – they simply did not appreciate the radical interpretive fact about
complementarity or any other linguistic shortcomings of legal rules.45 Some others reacted with
more nuance, and used, somewhat vaguely, 'plausible interpretation' as the yardstick to measure
law's elasticity. 46 Policy in their view is broader than what McDougal grants – compliance with
international law itself is a policy "by which government elites seek to attain certain goals."47
The main problem of McDougal's expectation of legal interpretation, according to another
reviewer, is in its emphasis on predictability, secured through technical means and jargon. But in
fact an acceptable combination of predictability and flexibility, from the viewpoint of states, is a
political question and not technical. "States do not ask how to maximize one, but how to
optimize the mixture of both."48
Yet some others, sympathetic to and raised in the NHS, have essentially given some
deference to McDougal's indeterminacy thesis but are critical of the extent to which McDougal is
willing to go to discredit the capacity of legal language to justifiably determine outcomes.
Richard Falk is an example of this group when he writes:
Acceptance of McDougal's position virtually severs the link between language and
meaning. For if complementary norms are equally plausible under most circumstances,
then no predictable impact upon behavior derives from adoption of a new prohibitive
rule. … Although legal rules, especially broad principles … such as self-defense, are not
delineated precisely enough that violative behavior can be identified with confidence,
49
something quite definite is communicated by the rule.

Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 128.
See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, supra note 12, at 373 (summing up the NHS's work on the treaty interpretation as a work
that while “[a]iming at order and liberality, its concepts, by their very breadth, open the door to anarchy and
abuse”).
46
Oliver Lissitzyn, Western and Soviet Perspectives on International Law: A Comparison, PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L.
21, 23 (1959).
47
Id.; see also Roger Fisher, Law and Policy in International Decisions, 135 SCI. 658, 659 (1962) (book review)
(“[I]n urging deciders to look away from rules to policy, [McDougal] overlooks the fundamental policy of having
disputes, differences, and questions of right, professedly and in fact, decided according to rules. . . . To accept his
policy-science is all but to ignore the policy of having law.”).
48
Peter Rohn, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure by
Myres S. McDougal; Harold D. Lasswell; James C. Miller, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540, 542 (1969) (book review).
49
Richard Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law. Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. J.
INT’L L. 231, 240–41 (1964).
44
45
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Far from merely taking a familiar, intermediate path and repeating a rule versus
standard solution, Falk in fact elsewhere turns his attention to the alternative sort of determinacy
that McDougal seeks under the cover of flexibility of policy and the critique of indeterminacy of
rules: "The extent of policy and normative flexibility represents less a jurisprudential 'fact' …
than a policy chosen because it promotes other policies."50 Falk is not concerned with the law's
objectivity or preserving some limit of linguistic determinacy – though both of these matter to
him to a moderate degree, but rather attempts to draw attention to the promotion of one kind of
determinacy over another at the expense of an exaggerated portrayal of indeterminacy of rules.
What results from the policy-oriented approach to treaty interpretation is not too much flexibility
and chaos but in fact too little room for maneuver and too little appreciation of the complexity of
contextual interpretation.51 The complexity and limitations of any interpretation are swept away
by the generality of method advocated by the NHS, which views the "tasks of treaty
interpretation to be homogeneous regardless of the subject matter of agreement and of the arena
wherein the interpretative event is located."52
Rather than accounting for changing
circumstantial factors, there is a great expectation invested in "genuine shared expectations" of
the parties as reinforced or altered in view of the "general community policies" in the policing
process of interpretation to establish the meaning of international agreements. This is just as
confining, if not more than, strict reference to rules for guidance:
Such an orienting formulation, preliminary to the application of "the method" for
consulting context, is at once too abstract and too indefinite to give the interpreter
guidance and too directive to allow the interpreter and those subject to his interpretation
53
an awareness of "the openness" of the interpretative situation.

An elaborate discussion of a policy-oriented approach to legal interpretation demands
more space. The intention here is merely to illustrate two points: that McDougal chose to
underappreciate international lawyers' recognition – albeit a mostly implicit and unarticulated
recognition – of the relative degree of determinacy of rules, principles and standards; and that his
own alternative contextualist interpretation was regarded to be beset by the same
indeterminacies, unless harnessed by a directional normative framework such as human dignity,
in the way that it was employed by the New Haven Jurisprudence.
McDougal's directional method of interpretation in essence sought to provide a middle
ground between the classic textualist approaches inherited from Vattel and comprehensively
codified in the 1935 Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, on the one
hand,54 and the views of those who found original intent to be no more than a fiction and
50

Richard Falk, Law and Minimum World Public Order by M. S. McDougal and Florentine Feliciano, 8 NAT. L. F.
171, 179 (1963) (book review).
51
Falk speaks of the limits of any method of interpretation resulting from
the nature of the agreement process, the imperfections of language as the medium by which agreements are
communicated through time and across space, the dynamic character of international public policy that shifts directives
to correspond with shifts in the structure and preferences of international society, and the inability of international
institutions to induce compliance with their will in relation to certain kinds of disputes about treaty obligations.

RICHARD FALK, On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements and Prospects, in THE
STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 342, 369, (1970).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
54
On the textualist approach, McDougal and associates write: “It is the grossest, least defensible exercise of
arbitrary formalism to arrogate to one particular set of signs—the text of a document—the role of serving as the
[continues on the next page]
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emphasized the judicial creativity of the decision-maker, on the other.55 The result, however,
was a method-driven system of interpretation that replaced the presumed constraints of rules
with a formulated articulation of 'shared expectations' and 'community policies' and developed a
contextualist framework with a degree of predictability in which there was in fact little need for
judicial creativity.
ii.—Complementarity and Ambiguity of Rules
Another challenge to McDougal's alleged complementarity of legal norms, in the
context of military necessity and principle of humanity, invites him to justify the polar
interaction of these principles with regard to permissible coercion. Against the principle of
military necessity which permits necessary and proportionate means and prohibits militarily
unnecessary and disproportionate ones, there is the principle of humanity, which under the name
of higher values of "a public order of human dignity" requires "that the least possible coercion be
applied to human beings, and that all authorized control over human beings be oriented towards
strategies of persuasion with the widest possible participation in decision, rather than towards
strategies of coercion."56 The reviewer asks if, given the higher order of the normative system of
human dignity, these two principles in fact ought not to be one and the same, that is, "economy
of force" be already imbued and ordered by the higher normative framework.57
In other words, if the normative commitments to human dignity were to supersede all
other considerations, then military utility would already be defined by limits on human behavior
in war and in peace. If this is so, the reviewer asks when "a military commander manages to
limit his means to the minimal requirements of objective military utility will he not have gone a
long way toward ensuring that the basic values of human dignity are disturbed as little as
possible?"58 Both the tone and the intent impelling this reaction give the impression that the
focus here is not on a fundamental question about McDougal's position on complementarity in
general, but specifically on the merging of humanitarianism into military assessment. At the cost
of erring on the side of a close reading, however, the review could also be thought to cavil about
McDougal's over-emphasis on complementarity, and cast doubt on the need to balancing, in
particular in a system where human dignity, in the last analysis, overrules all the circumstantial
factors that could possibly impact the decision-making process.
iii.—Implicit and Explicit Reactions to Policy Conceptualism
It is the discipline's implicit or explicit reference to what this essay presents as policy
conceptualism that McDougal either entirely evades, or distortedly translates into a defense of
the rule of law to then abruptly dismiss. This rhetorical game characteristic to McDougal might
be more understandable when he reacts to some of the more implicit critiques of conceptualism,
as they are mostly buried in substantial arguments for what one, in full sympathy with
exclusive index of the parties' shared expectations. We join with those who condemn textualism of this kind as a
violation of the human dignity to choose freely.” MYERS S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & JAMES C.
MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF
CONTENT AND PROCEDURE, at xvii (1994).
55
“The view we recommend thus rejects the excessive emphases of recent years both upon hierarchy as in Beckett
and Fitzmaurice, and upon freedom of decision as in Hyde, Stone, and others. The choice between an ordered
hierarchy of rules and the rejection of all rules is one which unnecessarily restricts the available alternatives.” Id. at
117.
56
MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 35, at 72.
57
William O'Brien, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulations of International Coercion by
Myers S. McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, 72 YALE L.J. 413, 419 (1962) (book review).
58
Id.
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McDougal, might in fact read as amounting to no more than a mere concern with the rule of law.
There were enough of positivists still around after all, who had no reservations to express rage
over what they saw as a disastrous consequence of policy arguments taking over the rule of
law.59 Some may have made a nuanced distinction between national and international law to
suggest that contrary to the former wherein "the national interests were being frustrated by a
strong and entrenched legal system," the latter is already injuriously subject to conflicting
interpretations of nations in light of domestic policies.60 That nuanced addition aside, there was
a lot in the way of distrust of allowing for policy in the unstable international arena.
Yet, for all the implicit dissatisfaction with conceptualism in the application of the
policy-oriented method, many expressed clear discontent with the rigidity inherently embedded
in the New Haven Jurisprudence and its policy conceptualism. Foreshadowed by Roscoe
Pound's idea of comparative study of systems of law as systems and starting from the study of
the interactions of individuals in groups or societies and their "divergent drives, competing
desires, conflicting ambitions," and the need for "social controls" to solve the conflicts thereof,61
and anticipated by Karl Llewellyn in "the overall design of decision-making and authorityapplying functions in the context of all social processes," the Lasswell-McDougal apparatus still
stands alone for being "highly abstract" and "conceptual."62 In contradistinction to Llewellyn's -and in fact to legal realism's -- idea of studying each "cluster" of legal phenomena as a sui
generis category, the Lasswell-McDougal formula seeks to establish an analytical method that
equally fits all social phenomena; "the result is that they automatically assume, without any
genuine empirical inquiry, that the formula does fit whatever subject they take up."63
Focusing on the expected contribution of a ‘theory,’ Oran Young writes that the adopted
conceptual apparatus from Lasswell,
failed to support the development of any theory (or theories) in the formal sense. In fact,
it tends to hinder the development of theory by introducing excessive numbers of
potentially relevant factors while the crucial problem in developing viable formal theories
is to construct simple logical models by stripping away as many factors as possible
without undermining the predictive accuracy of the resultant propositions. . . . Much (of
the apparatus) is characterized by a rigid formalism that frequently makes it difficult to fit
59

For an example of a positivist-inspired debate with McDougal, see Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council:
Abstention from Voting and Absence from Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209 (1951). For McDougal's rebuttal, see Myers
S. McDougal & Richard Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258
(1951).
60
Fisher, supra note 47, at 659.
61
Roscoe Pound, Philosophy of Law and Comparative Law, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1951), cited in A.R.
Blackshield, The Policy Science Approach to Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Legal and Sociological Concepts of
Lasswell and McDougal 17 (23 Australian Soc’y of Legal Phil., Working Paper No. 5, 1964).
62
Blackshield, supra note 61.
63
Id. at 18. Even the admirers of the NHS, who believe McDougal's theories have “a remarkable capacity to
stimulate thinking about law and legal processes,” “have a most comprehensive viewpoint,” and a conceptual
structure which is “brilliantly successful in achieving comprehensiveness and synthesizing capability.” Cannot help
but wish that he “had given equal treatment to the problem of identifying other components of the laws of war to
that they gave to identifying policy goals.” Ernest Jones, Law and Minimum World Public Order; The Legal
Regulation of International Coercion. By Myers S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 341,
345, 347 (1963) (book review); see also Weston, supra note 34, at 117 (finding, as a close associate of the New
Haven School, "excessive theoretical abstraction" to be a problem plaguing Interpretation of Agreements). For a
contrary view, see, for example, Courtland Peterson, The Public Order of the Oceans, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115, 118
(1965) (book review) (“[I]n international law change from sterile conceptualism has been slow and sporadic. The
Public Order books are the first truly major effort in this direction.”).
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observations of the real world into the framework's categorization with any comfort. The
scheme tends to encourage the proliferation of logically possible boxes or categories that
sometimes have little substantive content and that often become difficult to manage in
64
analytic terms.

Oriented in a social science perspective, Young is wary of the formulaic structure of
policy science and the way its method-driven approach stands apart from the most desirable
aspect of a theory, parsimony. So he attributes any success the NHS has had to McDougal's
brilliance rather than to Lasswell's framework of analysis, as the "employment of the conceptual
apparatus alone is not a sufficient condition for the production of outstanding legal analysis."65
Misgivings about the NHS's conceptual apparatus were not merely because of its
complexity, but also because it was viewed largely as superfluous.66 Richard Posner took an
exemplary quote from Law and Public Order in Space to suggest that, as realistic and
sophisticated as it was, the work was riddled with a set of formal characteristics: "an elaborate
analytic machinery; an appearance of logical or scientific rigorousness and precision; a
specialized vocabulary; and great length - for the authors are indefatigable in applying the
'various relevant intellectual techniques' to every facet of every problem they take up."67 The
comprehensive modality is mostly nothing more than "empty conceptualizing," introducing, for
instance, a standard of 'reasonableness' that, while promises to resolve the question of occasional
exclusive competence in outer space, in fact is just the beginning and not the end in legal
analysis.68
It was not only the complex conceptual apparatus of policy science, but also the
centrality of a set of values representing human dignity in legal decision-making that raised
dismissive eyebrows and a great deal of suspicion as to return of conceptualism. McDougal saw
the novelty of policy sciences as a development of legal realism and its extension from critique
to a positive proposal. A colleague at Yale, Grant Gilmore, disagreed and found some
resemblance between the New Haven apparatus and Langdellian conceptualism: "Despite the
novelty of its trappings, the work of McDougal and Lasswell, particularly in its insistence that
everything can be reduced to a few general principles, can, not unfairly, be taken as a return
toward older theories of law."69 The NHS's evasion of both natural law and positivism also, by
Oran Young, International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myers S. McDougal, 66 AM. J. INT’L L.
60, 69 (1972) (1972) (emphasis added).
65
Id., at 69. For a contrary view, see Michael N. Schmitt, New Haven Revisited: Law, Policy, and the Pursuit of
World Order, 1 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 193 (1990) (“[T]he value of the New Haven approach is to be
found, in great part, in its comprehensive nature.”).
66
Richard Posner, Review of Law and Public Order in Space by Myers S. McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Ivan
Vlasic, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1370, 1370 (1964).
67
Id. at 1371.
68
Posner continues:
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All the authors really have to say about the problem of national sovereignty in space is that the law of the sea, with its
basic rule of freedom, offers a closer analogy than the law of the air, with its rule of sovereignty. While this is a sound
observation, it should not require several hundred pages to make, and little is gained by garnishing it with a highsounding, but on examination almost meaningless, 'rule of reason.'

Id. at 1371; see also G. Vernon Leopold, Law and Public Order in Space, 42 U. DET. L.J. 238, 239 (1964) (book
review) (complaining about “semantic gymnastics” of McDougal and associates that “only serve to confuse and
obscure their labors” and their use of “pseudo mathematically” stated propositions that are in fact novel
abstractions).
69
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 90 (1977).
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giving a primary place of importance to 'community interest's,' "as the explanation of the 'is,' as
the criteria for the 'ought,' and as an answer to the 'why' of the law is a substitution of a policyoriented 'community interest' for a restatement 'rule.'"70 'Community interest,' therefore, is an
absolute in and of itself for the policy-oriented jurisprudence. "Whether following the policyoriented absolute is in the interest of the community any more than following 'rules' or, indeed,
any other absolute, depends on the evaluation of the community interest in view of the logical
conclusion that may inevitably follow from the hypothesis of the policy-oriented
jurisprudence."71

V. Conclusion
That contra the received wisdom, the NHS’s success in antagonizing the discipline
against its policy-oriented heresy did not owe to the latter’s principled hostility against policy
reasoning, but rather to a clear, if not clearly articulated, opposition to the New Haven’s policy
conceptualism is not merely a historical counter-narrative. Nor is it only a matter of hairsplitting to argue that the NHS’s apparent partiality for the ‘particular’ disguised as the
‘universal’ is not only a question of application, as the literature believes, but also results from
the very epistemic structure of the New Haven Jurisprudence. Both are of significant
jurisprudential implications.
First, the conventional story of New Haven’s policy pragmatism versus a unifiedly
defiant, formalist international law leaves the NHS with little more than banal academic
visibility. The real, but invisible, impact of the New Haven jurisprudence is in presenting a form
of policy – policy conceptualism – that triggered such an opposition amongst international
lawyers who preferred the contextualist possibilities not entirely foreclosed in legal interpretive
labor over the over-determinative and formulaic function of human dignity and other NHS’s
conceptual categories.
Second, another invisible but enduring legacy of the NHS, understood
through the present counter-narrative, is a new vista through which to
caution against the pitfalls of policy reasoning and to demand its promises.
International legal theory has a relatively clear sense about abuse of
deduction when found in legal interpretation, but it has little to say about
similar defects in policy reasoning. Equally undertheorized are our ideas
about the very concept of policy and its place in international legal
argumentation. Pursued policy objectives might be principled or flexible
and their application flexible or principled. So a combination of principled
policies and flexible application of those policies or vice-versa might well
permeate the words and practice of international lawyers, used
simultaneously or selectively – depending on the context – to address
international legal problems. And then there is percolation of these
conflicting modalities – principled policies and unprincipled applications or
the other way around – through different professional roles that
international lawyers habitually adopt – what Richard Falk calls "a kind of
odd and unappreciated overlap between … 'careerist' or 'vocational'
concerns of international lawyers and the moral imperatives of good
citizenship on matters of world affairs."72 We can begin to understand all
70

Eliezer Ereli, The Public Order of the Oceans, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1963) (book review).
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Richard Falk, The Place of Policy in International Law, 2 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29, 30 (1972).
[continues on the next page]
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that complexity only when we acknowledge the fallacy of an inherent
association between law and formalism and between policy and antiformalism. Re-telling the story of the NHS was an effort to do just that.
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